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STATE IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY AS
AFFECTED BY COMPETITIVE BUSINESS
ACTIVITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an anachronistic rem-
nant of the divine right of Kings. The historical supporting maxims
of sovereign immunity, "The King can do no wrong" and "He
who makes the laws shall not be subjected to them," are no more
than legal curiosities when countered by the foundation of our civil
law that one suffering injury at the hands of another is entitled
to compensation from the wrongdoer. The cabalistic distinctions
between governmental and proprietary functions which have been
used to ameliorate the harshness of the doctrine of governmental
immunity are no longer useful in that they tend to obscure their
original function. As the state extends the range of its services and
increasingly engages in activities which might equally be under-
taken by private individuals and corporations, the unreasonableness
of shielding such enterprises with sovereign immunity becomes
apparent. Not only would the application of immunity in .. .
[such] ...case[s] subvert the keystone theory underlying civil
liability thereby derogating the right to compensation of injured
persons, but it would impose an additional indirect burden on
private enterprise, engaging in competition with the public cor-
poration in competitive media .... I
The purpose of this comment is to propose a limitation, which
the courts might be persuaded to adopt, on a state's immunity when
it engages in active competition with private enterprise. The justifi-
cation for re-examining the doctrine of sovereign immunity before ex-
tending it into new areas can be summarized in three points:
First, a comparison of economic trends today with those prevail-
ing in the period when sovereign immunity was developed reveals the
inappropriateness of the present law. Sovereign immunity was
adopted by the courts during the hey-day of the laissez faire phi-
losophy. The theory was that if government were compelled to pay
for its torts, it could do so only by taking from the rest of society
through taxation, thereby increasing each individual's burden of
maintaining government and decreasing his capacity to provide for
himself.' However, times have changed and the interest in the eco-
1 Hoffmeyer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm., 83 Ohio L. Abs. 391, 166 N.E.2d 543 (1960).
2 One of the earliest and most vigorous attacks on sovereign immunity was waged
by Professor Borchard in a series of articles. In these articles is a tracing of sovereign
immunity from its inception to the time of publication, Borchard, "Government Liability
in Tort," 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924); 36 id. 1, 757, 1039 (1927); 28 Colum. L. Rev.
577, 734 (1928).
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nomic freedom of the individual has long ago been subordinated to
the desire for social and economic security. The overwhelming trend
is toward spreading of losses throughout society and lessening the
risk to each individual.3 Regardless of one's predilection on the merits
of this movement, the fact that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
bucks this trend should justify a re-examination of the immunity
doctrine.
Secondly, since the traditional functions of state governments
have long been immune it is difficult to persuade the courts to
overrule this stand. If relief is to come in this area, it must be
from the legislatures. But even here, because of the fears of many
legislators of the havoc which complete waiver of immunity might
bring upon governmental operations, and the absence of any organized
pressure groups urging such a waiver, legislative action is very likely
to be sporadic and incomplete for many years.4 When one considers
the courts' role in the inception and perpetuation of sovereign im-
munity, is it unreasonable to urge that they deny immunity in new
situations where they need not feel bound by precedent? The original
reasons for adopting this doctrine can no longer support its extension
into new areas.
The third factor justifying judicial re-examination of the im-
munity doctrine is the rapid expansion of state agencies into fields
of endeavor in which they compete with private enterprise for the
public's patronage. Irrigation projects, printing plants, toll bridges
and roads, steam and electric railroads, airports, power plants, coal
mines, cement plants, warehouses, grain elevators, and insurance and
banking companies are among the many state enterprises.' A glance
3 In order to carry out the many functions which modern government must under-
take to secure the needs of society, government must expand its activities. As its opera-
tions become more extensive, there is a corresponding increase in the likelihood of injuries
to individuals. Unless the resulting loss is assumed by government and spread through-
out the society which is benefiting from the activity, the goal of maximum satisfaction
for everyone in society cannot be obtained.
4 Gibbons, "Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Govern-
ment," 1959 Duke L.J. 588; Davis, "Tort Liability of Governmental Units," 40 Minn. L.
Rev. 751,760 (1956); Leflar & Kantrowitz, "Tort Liability of the States," 29 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1363 (1954) (This article is a state by state survey of the extent of liability, ff
any, and procedural steps necessary to recover for injury at the hands of the state).
A less extensive survey can be found in Note, "Administration of Claims Against the
Sovereign-A Survey of State Techniques," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506 (1955). Two articles
tracing immunity through its development in Arkansas are Waterman, "100 Years of a
State's Immunity from Suit," 14 Texas L. Rev. 135 (1936) reprinted in 2 Ark. L. Rev.
354 (1948); and Eckert, "Another Decade of State Immunity to Suit," 2 Ark. L. Rev.
375 (1948).
G Johnson, Government in the United States 710 (1956); MacDonald, American
State Government and Administration 602 (1955); Shultz & Harriss, American Public
Finance 607-609 (1949). For an analysis of the overall effect of "State Trading" on
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at this casual listing reveals many areas of head-on competition with
private enterprise.
While we are concerned primarily with freedom from tort lia-
bility, the sovereign's status gives the state business an advantage in
at least two other ways.' One advantage is the saving to the state
enterprise by virtue of its immunity from many taxes. The immunity
from many governmental regulations also gives the state-controlled
business an operating advantage. 7 These aspects of immunity involve
the problem of inter-governmental relations and are beyond the scope
of this comment.8 It is sufficient to recognize their existence and the
economic benefits accruing to the state business from their application.
Since we are primarily interested with the freedom from tort
liability enjoyed by state agencies, the question to be resolved is
whether the courts, in the absence of legislative directives, should
hold that immunity does not extend to state agencies in competition
with private business. In order for the courts to impose tort liability
in this area and also retain immunity for the traditional functions of
government, some line of demarcation must be adopted to distinguish
non-immune functions from those within the immunity doctrine.
While anything short of complete waiver of immunity will result in
the barring of legitimate claims against the state, for the reasons
enumerated above, success in the courts is more likely if an approach
is adopted which will attack this immunity in a piecemeal fashion.
EXISTING DISTINCTIONS
Discretionary Function
The "discretionary function" test developed by the federal courts
in applying the Federal Tort Claims Act? does not appear to be
readily adaptable to the solution of our problem. This test originated
in the clause preserving the immunity of the United States for acts
modern society, see 24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 241-366 (1959) which is an entire sym-
posium devoted to this development in the United States.
I For a discussion of the effect of state trading on these immunities, see Setser, "The
Immunities of the State and Government Economic Activities," 24 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 291 (1959).
7 This immunity applies most favorably to a federal business by exempting it from
the application of many state regulations, Setser, supra note 6 at 300. On the state level,
while a state business may be exempted from some municipal regulations, the red tape
involved in any government agency probably outweighs any advantage over private
companies subject to the municipal regulation.
8 For discussions of these immunities, see Setser, supra note 6; Note, "Immunity
from Statutes of Limitations and Other Doctrines Favoring the United States as Plaintiff,"
55 Colum. L. Rev. 1177 (1955); Ratchford, "Intergovernmental Tax Immunities in the
United States," 6 Nat'l Tax J. 305 (1953).
9 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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committed within the "discretionary function or duty" of any federal
agency or employee.Y0 The Tort Claims Act itself purports to render
the United States liable "... in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances."" It is
apparent from reading the act that Congress did not intend to waive
immunity for all governmental functions.' Since the Supreme Court
has refused to adopt the "proprietary-governmental" distinction tra-
ditionally used to determine liability on the municipal level,13 some
other distinction had to be developed.
In Dalehite v. United States,'4 the Supreme Court interpreted
the "discretionary function" clause as a limitation on the general
liability clause. The difficulty in applying this distinction lies in
discovering what a discretionary act is, when it starts, and when it
ends. As to the point at which discretion ends, the Court stated that,
"it is unnecessary to define ... precisely where discretion ends. It is
enough to hold, as we do, that the 'discretionary function or duty'
that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes
more than the initiation of programs and activities."'15 From this,
the lower federal courts have distinguished between acts of discretion,
made at the "planning" or "policy making" level, and negligent acts
or omissions at the "operational" level, holding the government liable
only in the latter situation.'
However, regardless of the interpretation given to this distinction,
it is clear that state courts will not accept it without statutory au-
thority since its application will remove immunity from many of the
functions which have traditionally been immune. An excellent ex-
ample of this is the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a
government employee. Under the "discretionary function" test, such
negligence will usually be actionable, regardless of the purpose of the
operation, since it is not a discretionary function.lT While this is
10 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1952). For a perceptive study of the "discretionary func-
tion" test, see Peck, "The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Constructioii of the
Discretionary Function Exception," 31 Wash. L. Rev. 207 (1956).
11 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952). For a study of the federal courts interpretation of the
scope of this general liability clause, see Note, "Federal Government Liability 'As a
Private Person' Under the Tort Claims Act," 33 Ind. L.J. 339 (1958).
12 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
13 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
14 Supra note 12.
1r Id. at 35.
16 Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Dahlstrom v. United States,
228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir.
1955); 2 Harper & James, Torts § 29.14 at 1657-1660 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 109 at
773 (2d ed. 1955).
17 Ibid.
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undoubtedly a desired result, it is impractical, in light of the courts'
reluctance to withdraw established immunity, to urge the adoption
of this test to deny immunity in the area under consideration.
Proprietary-Governmental
The "proprietary-governmental" distinction does not appear to
be readily adaptable to states either,' 8 at least in its present state of
development. The scheme of removing immunity from a municipality
when it is engaged in a proprietary function has been attacked by
legal analysts as inherently unsound since it was formally adopted in
1842 in Bailey v. City of New York. 19 Yet this doctrine has been
adopted and applied, at one time or another, with varying degrees of
success and persistency by every state in the union.2" South Carolina
and Florida are the only states which have repudiated this distinction
by judicial action, stating that the quagmire of conflicting decisions
rendered it impossible to apply the law coherently to any given situ-
ation. In repudiating, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted
complete immunity to the municipality unless waived by the legisla-
ture.2 1 Thus, the situation was cured by turning a possible chance
of recovery into no chance whatever. On the other hand, Florida has
imposed liability on the municipality without regard to the nature of
the function causing the injury.2
A municipality is clothed with a two-fold function; one govern-
mental, and the other proprietary. In the performance of a gov-
18 The adoption of this distinction was urged upon the state courts as early as 1916,
without success, Maguire, "State Liability for Tort," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 20 (1916).
-19 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842). The earliest United States case to impose liability on
this basis apparently was Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 Fed. Cas. 461 (No. 6666) (C.C.D.C.
1802). For a historical development of this doctrine, see Barnett, "The Foundations
of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common
Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations," 16 Ore. L. Rev. 250 (1937).
Some of the more vigorous attacks can be found in, Borchard, supra note 2; Fuller
& Casner, "Municipal Tort Liability in Action," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Harno,
"Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations," 4 Ill. L.Q. 28 (1921); Tooke, "The Ex-
tension of Municipal Liability in Tort," 19 Va. L. Rev. 97 (1932); Seasongood, "Muni-
cipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test," 22 Va. L.
Rev. 910 (1936). For a survey of the legal writings on this topic, see Repko, "American
Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability," 9 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 214 (1942) (this article is part of a symposium on Governmental Tort Liability, 9
Law & Contemp. Prob.). For a survey of the applicable case law, see Annot., 120
A.L.R. 1376 (1939).
20 Repko, supra note 19; 2 Harper & James, Torts § 29.6 (1956).
21 Irvine v. Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911). Ohio appeared to head
in the opposite direction by creating a presumption that the function was proprietary,
Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919), but this bold step
was retracted in Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
22 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
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ernmental function, the municipality acts as an agency of the state
to enable it to better govern that portion of its people residing
within its corporate limits . .. There is granted to a municipal
corporation, in its corporate and proprietary character, privileges
and powers to be exercised for its private advantage. In the per-
formance of these duties the general public may derive a common
benefit, but they are granted and assumed primarily for the bene-
fit of the corporation.
23
The difficulties in applying this abstract statement of the law
to such functions as the operation of an airport, collection of garbage,
maintenance and operation of streets and sewers, and the operation of
wharves and docks are apparent; it is no surprise that courts have
found themselves in hopeless conflict on the classification of these
and similar functions.21 When the above difficulties are compounded
by the two situations in which liability is imposed regardless of the
function being performed, 3 the problems encountered in attempting
to apply this distinction at the state level become painfully clear.
There are two major blocks to any attempt to invoke this test
on the state level. The first is the historical differences delineated in
the above quote. Regardless of the validity of these differences today,
the courts will at least recognize them, and they will provide a handy
peg for any court not wholly receptive to any scheme to limit state
immunity. The second, and major, block is that this distinction, like
the "discretionary function" test, would render many state functions
subject to liability which traditionally have been immune.26 Only in
rare situations will the courts accept any refinement in sovereign
immunity which will erase any great amount of established immunity.
The New York Test: "Purely Governmental"
The New York Court of Claims Act provides that, "the state
hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
1957). See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1198 (1958) for a summary of the case law on
municipal tort liability. The Hargrove case has been discussed in 7 Duke LJ. 142
(1958); 71 Harv. L. Rev. 744 (1958); 4 How. L.J. 131 (1958); 56 Mich. L. Rev. 465
(1958); 29 Miss. L.J. 240 (1958); 11 U.Fla. L. Rev. 121 (1958); and 11 Vand. L. Rev.
253 (1957).
23 Hoogard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145,147, 200 S.E. 610,611 (1939).
24 2 Harper & James, Torts § 29.6 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 109 at 775 (2d ed.
1955). For a more detailed analysis of the conflicts in this area, see 18 McQulllin,
Municipal Corporations §§ 53.23-53.59 (3d ed. 1950).
25 These exceptions are: (1) Where the injury is the direct result of a trespass on
private property, the only escape from liability for the municipality is to prove state
authorization for the trespass. (2) There is no escape when the injury results from
the city creating, maintaining, or tolerating a nuisance. For a discussion of these ex-
ceptions and their importance in municipal tort liability, see Repko, supra note 19.
26 Such an effect would be certain since the original purpose for creating the
distinction was to limit immunity on the municipal level. Barnett, supra note 19.
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assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in ac-
cordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the
supreme court against individuals or corporations ... .
The major problem presented by the wording of the liability
clause concerns those functions which are performed only by govern-
ment." Since such "purely governmental" functions have been tra-
ditionally immune, most courts will not deny immunity in these situ-
ations without express statutory authorization. Therefore, while it
is important to recognize this problem created by such a waiver, our
primary concern with this statute is to determine why New York
courts have not adopted the previously discussed distinctions.
In Dulinak v. State,29 decided in 1940, the New York Court of
Claims expressly rejected the "proprietary-governmental" test as it
had been applied to municipalities. The court allowed recovery for
an injury resulting from the negligent maintenance of a stoplight
on a state highway. The municipality cases which would have barred
recovery on the theory that the maintenance of a stoplight is a pro-
prietary function, were distinguished by stating that, "however, the
foregoing authorities were not suits against the State of New York."
As is apparent from this case, the result of refusing to adopt the
"proprietary-governmental" distinction is to allow recovery where
it would be barred under a strict application of the test.
While the New York courts have not expressly rejected the "dis-
cretionary function" test, neither have they adopted it. This is not
surprising since the New York act does not contain any limitation
similar to the "discretionary function" clause in the United States
waiver statute. However, in applying New York's test of "purely
governmental" to such functions as legislative acts, judicial acts, in-
spection services, and police activities, the results are similar to those
reached under the "discretionary function" test.30 It is significant
in this respect that New York decisions seem to have influenced the
United States Supreme Court in a number of cases decided under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 1
27 N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8.
28 An excellent analysis of the New York courts' approach to this problem can
be found in Herzog, "Liability of the State of New York for 'Purely Governmental'
Functions," 10 Syracuse L. Rev. 30 (1958).
29 177 Misc. 368, 30 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Ct.CI. 1940), aff'd 262 App. Div. 1064, 30
N.Y.S.2d 838 (1941).
30 Compare the analysis in Herzog, supra note 28, with those in Peck, supra note
10, and Note, supra note 11. See 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1386 (1959) for a discussion of the
New York case imposing liability for failing to provide adequate police protection to
the informer on Willie Sutton.
31 Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917) and Goldstein v. State, 281
N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939) were cited in Dalehite v. United States, supra note 12;
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Perhaps the reason New York has adopted neither of the exist-
ing tests can be discovered in their basic difference: In the "govern-
mental-proprietary" test, the same activity may receive different
treatment, liability depending on whether the purpose motivating the
tortious act was governmental or proprietary in nature.3 2 On the
other hand, in applying the "discretionary function" test, similar
activities will always receive the same treatment since the act itself
controls, rather than the purpose behind the act as in the proprietary
distinction. The New York courts seem unwilling to be committed
to either of these approaches.
Thus, the only jurisdictions which have adopted the existing dis-
tinctions and applied them above the municipal level have done so
under statutory authority. If sovereign immunity is to be limited and
not extended to new areas of state functions, some test must be de-
veloped which will be acceptable to the courts.
"COMPETITION" DISTINCTION
An examination of recent cases in this area suggests that the
courts are developing a test which is sometimes called "proprietary-
governmental" by the courts, but which is actually much more limited
and specific. A positive statement of this test would be something
similar to this: Sovereign immunity does not extend ta state agencies
created for the purpose of performing functions which bring the state
into competition with private enterprise in areas which have been
traditionally considered as fields of private endeavor.-
The theory that a state may lose its immunity by entering into
private competitive fields is not new. As early as 1824 Chief Justice
Marshall said in Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia,3 5
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so
Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945) and Foley v.
State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945) were cited in Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, supra note 13. For a discussion of the importance of New York cases in the
interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Peck, supra note 10.
32 Thus, if a person is injured by the negligent operation of a city vehicle while
the operator of the vehicle is engaged in laying out or planning a sewer, no liability
will attach; but if the same accident involving the same parties and vehicles had occurred
during a repairing operation to an existing sewer, liability would result, Prosser, Torts
§ 109 at 777-778 (2d ed. 1955).
33 Herzog, supra note 28.
34 Once the courts decide that an agency fits within this rule, immunity should
not extend to any of its functions, regardless of how "governmental" some of its
activities may appear. By following this uncompromising approach, perhaps the courts
can force the legislature to spell out in detail which of its agencies are to enjoy immunity
and to what extent.
35 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 904, 906 (1824).
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far as concerns the transactions of the company, of its sovereign
character and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communi-
cating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends
to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the
character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which
is to be transacted.
The language used by that great jurist certainly fits the situation
with which we are faced. However, when the words are placed in
the context, we discover that Marshall was referring to contract
liability, not tort liability. Such expressions in the early cases are
significant only in that they planted the seed for extension of this
doctrine into the tort area. 6
The application of any functional distinction on the state level
has met with varying and conflicting interpretation, both within and
among states. Two Missouri cases will show how courts place very
different meanings on such terms as "proprietary" when confronted
with different situations. In a tort action against a county for raising
the level of a road grade, the Missouri Supreme Court held road
grading to be a governmental function, although admitting that the
same function performed by a municipality would have been pro-
prietary.37 Six years later, the same court upheld an action for an
alleged breach of a lease against the Board of State Charity Managers,
distinguishing the case from a prior dismissal of a tort against the
same department by proclaiming that ". . . the present action is not
in tort, but for the breach of an alleged lease contract, a proprietary
matter.""8 (Emphasis added.) In none of the above cases had the
legislature waived immunity to suit.
At the present time, probably no more than five states have
expressly refused to recognize possible tort liability of the state
based on the function being performed. On the other hand, many
states have paid lip service to some sort of distinction, but one is
hard pressed to find many concrete examples of liability imposed
solely on the basis of the function performed.3 9
The approach of the Louisiana courts to this problem is worthy
of note. In 1932, a Louisiana court soundly blasted the extension of
36 Similar cases are Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853); Darring-
ton v. Bank of Alabama, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 12 (1851); Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); Sargent County v. State, 47 N.D. 561, 182 N.W. 270
(1921).
37 Zoll v. St. Louis County, 343 Mo. 1031, 124 S.W.2d 1168 (1938).
38 White v. Jones, 352 Mo. 354, 177 S.W.2d 603 (1944).
39 The most famous case rejecting any such distinction on the state level is Riddock
v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450 (1912). Other cases purporting to follow the prin-
ciple that a state acts only in a governmental capacity are collected in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d
927,932 (1955).
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immunity to state corporations and agencies, but concluded that
relief could only come from the legislature." Then in 1954, the court
pounced on the legislative authorization of a State Soil Conservation
District to "sue and be sued" as an express waiver of all immunity,
thus allowing recovery for the negligence of a truck driver-employee
of the district.41
The New Jersey Supreme Court took a similar approach in a
recent case involving an injury to a visitor on the premises of a
tenement house condemned under eminent domain by the Highway
Authority, the tenants having not yet been evicted. The court con-
cluded that maintaining a tenement house was a proprietary function
and allowed suit under a statute impowering the Highway Authority
to "sue and be sued." In support of this interpretation of the statute,
the court quoted Judge Cardozo to the effect that:
The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship
enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its
rigor by refinement of construction, where consent has been an-
nounced. 4 3
Under a limited waiver-of-immunity statute,' California has
adopted a variation of the suggested distinction. In the early cases
following the enactment of the 1893 statute, the courts were very
slow to find a non-governmental activity. However, the tide turned in
1947 when the court decided People v. Superior Court.45 In this
celebrated decision the court also brushed aside an earlier unsound
test that required that the state agency be run with the intent to earn
a profit before it could be held liable in tort.46 The California cases
40 Orgeron v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 19 La. App. 628, 140 So. 282 (1932).
41 Long v. N.E. Soil Conserv. Dist. of La., 72 So. 2d 543 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
Accord, Western R.R. v. Carlton, 28 Ga. 180 (1859).
42 Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956).
43 Anderson v. John L. Hays Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140,147, 153 N.E. 28,29 (1926).
44 Cal. Gov. Code § 16041 (1893): "Any person who has a claim against the
State (1) on express contract, (2) for negligence, or (3) for the taking or damaging of
private property for public use within the meaning of Section 14 of Article I of the
Constitution, shall present the claim to the board in accordance with Section 16021.
If the claim is rejected or disallowed by the board, the claimant may bring an action
against the State on the claim and prosecute it to final judgment, subject to the con-
ditions prescribed by this chapter." (Emphasis added.) This act has been interpreted
as waiving only the state's immunity from suit, not from liability, 27 So. Cal. L. Rev.
490 (1954).
45 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947). Although the court cited Green v. State,
73 Cal. 29, 14 Pac. 610 (1887), as authority for the origination of the distinction
based on activity in California, it was not until People v. Superior Court was decided
that this distinction had a non-governmental side.
46 This test had been propounded 20 years earlier in Rauschan v. Gilbert, 80 Cal.
App. 754, 253 Pac. 173 (1927), in which the court refused recovery against a state in-
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are not yet clear as to the test being applied by the courts; although
called "proprietary-governmental," it appears to be similar to the
test suggested in this article. A survey of the California cases dis-
closes the imposition of tort liability for such functions as operating
a railroad,47 providing entertainment facilities at a state fair,4 s slum
clearances, 9 and presenting National Guard firepower demonstrations
to entertain the public.5" On the other hand, operating a toll bridge,5
leasing state-owned wharves to private concerns, 5 operating a har-
bor,53 and relocating a river54 have been held activities to which
governmental immunity extends.
The Ohio situation is illustrated by two recent Ohio Supreme
Court decisions. The court appeared to be headed toward a re-
examination of immunity when in Avellone v. St. Johns Hospital,55
it overruled the line of cases granting immunity to charitable hospitals.
In that case, the reasons for immunity were explored and held not to
substantiate further application of the doctrine in the situation under
scrutiny. Despite this glowing attack on immunity, three years later
in Wolf v. Ohio State University Hospital,56 the court upheld the
traditional concept of immunity when the state was involved. In this
case, an employee of the hospital was clearly negligent in giving
surance fund since the operation was not allowed to make a profit, but only to be
self-sustaining.
47 Green v. State, supra note 45.
48 Guidi v. State, 41 Cal. 2d 623, 262 P.2d 3 (1953) which overruled Melvin v.
State, 121 Cal. 16, 53 Pac. 416 (1898). The Guidi case was followed in Brown v. 15th
Agricultural Fair Ass'n, 159 Cal. App. 2d 93, 323 P.2d 131 (1958). Contra, Zoeller v.
State Board of Agriculture, 163 Ky. 446, 173 S.W. 1143 (1915) (operation of fair
held to be a governmental function). A discussion of the Guidi case and the California
law under their consent statute can be found in 27 So. Cal. L. Rev. 490 (1952).
49 Muses v. Housing Auth., 83 Cal. App. 2d 489, 189 P.2d 305 (1948). The action
was against a county as an arm of the state. For a discussion on the tort liability of
counties when engaged in proprietary functions, see Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1079 (1951).
50 Pianka v. State, 46 Cal. 2d 208, 293 P.2d 458 (1956).
51 Bettencourt v. State, 123 Cal. App. 2d 60, 266 P.2d 201 (1954).
52 Schwerdtfeger v. State, 148 Cal. App. 2d 335, 306 P.2d 960 (1957).
53 Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 55 Pac. 1000 (1899).
54 Green v. State, supra note 45.
55 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956). The effect of this progressive decision
has been severely curtailed in a recent ill-considered opinion, Gibbon v. YWCA, 170
Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960). An excellent discussion of this case can be found in
21 Ohio St. L.J. 247 (1960). The latest episode of charitable immunity in Ohio evidences
a trend analogous to that in state immunity discussed in this comment. In Blankenship
v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960), the supreme court held that a church
waived its immunity by sponsoring bingo games for profit, and was therefore subject
to liability for the injury to a participant in the bingo contest caused by a collapsing
chair.
56 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959).
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plaintiff tetanus antitoxin over her protest when a test had indicated
her allergy thereto. The only question decided by the court was
whether the trustees of the Ohio State University were suable in tort.
The court concluded that since the defendant was an arm of the state
government, it was immune from tort liability unless expressly waived
by statute. There being no such waiver, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity precluded suit against defendant "... . at least while engaged
in governmental functions or activities.""7 Thus, the court implied
that the state may be liable in tort while engaged in non-governmental
functions. Judge Taft, concurring, expressly reserved as not before
the court the question whether the trustees would be liable for negli-
gence in the performance of a proprietary function. 8 It is worthy
of note that while state-run hospitals are in competition with private
hospitals, most courts which have decided the question have held that
the operation of such hospitals involves a governmental function. 9
Hoffmeyer v. Ohio Turnpike Commission,60 decided by the Com-
mon Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County in April of 1960, if upheld, will
open new horizons for recovery against state agencies in Ohio. The
case involved a tort action against the Commission for the alleged
unprovoked assault by its employees upon the plaintiff, a customer
at a Turnpike Service Plaza. The court looked at the overall scheme
of the authorizing legislation 6' to determine whether the prevailing
function of the undertaking was governmental or private in character.
The conclusion reached was that the Turnpike was more in the nature
of a private endeavor than a governmental activity. Thus the Com-
mission's motion for summary judgment based on immunity was
denied.
The case is also important in that it expressly states an important
consideration which underlies many of the decisions in this area. In
the court's words,
The test used to determine entity and therefore liability is whether
or not state funds would be subjected to the payment of the judg-
ment in the event the Commission is found liable.62
57 Id. at 53, 162 N.E.2d at 478. It is important to note that this line is a quote
from "Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning," Annot.,
160 A.L.R. 7,52 (1946).
58 Id. at 54, 162 N.E.2d at 479, "Whether it [the state] is suable or liable in tort
for negligence in the performance of a proprietary function is a question not before
us for determination in this case."
59 Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 at 210 (1952).
60 Supra note 1. Accord, Hope Natural Gas Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Comm'r,
105 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1958).
01 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5537.01-5537.99 (1954).
62 Supra note 1 at 393, 166 N.E.2d at 545- This test is similar to the argument
for charitable immunity, see 21 Ohio St. LJ. 247 (1960).
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Thus, "financial independence" becomes the test for non-immunity,
provided the function being performed is of a non-governmental
nature.
Another recent opinion seizing upon the isolation of state funds
was written in State Ins-. Fund v. Bone,6 3 a 1959 Oklahoma case im-
posing laibility on the Fund in a tort action arising out of an auto-
mobile accident involving the plaintiff and an employee of the Fund.
The court stated that ". . .under no circumstances can the general funds
of the State be reached in order to satisfy an obligation of the fund."'
The court in the Bone case employed the logical argument that since
state law required private insurance companies to provide for such
contingencies as tort liability, in the absence of express legislative
authority, the court could not conclude that the state agency which
was actively competing for the public's patronage could escape provid-
ing the same remedies.
The concept advanced in these two cases, while an adequate
answer to the protection-of-public-funds argument explored in the
next section, is undesirable as a limitation on the suggested test pre-
viously stated. Even though this isolation test would impose liability
in some situations in which the state might otherwise be immune, it
would also rule out recovery in many deserving situations in which
public funds would be invaded. A comparison of the two Ohio cases
discussed earlier will point out the anomalies which result from such
a rule. In the Wolf case, public funds would have to be invaded since
the University Hospital operates out of the general fund of the state.
However, the income from the operation of the hospital is poured
into the general fund so that an accounting would be necessary to
determine whether a profit or loss results from the operation of the
hospital. But regardless whether a gain or loss results, the important
consideration is where the ultimate loss in case of recovery will fall.
In this situation, while the loss would be borne directly by the general
fund, eventually it would come to rest on the taxpayer. In the Turn-
pike case, the loss could be passed on to the users of the road. In
either situation, the ultimate loss comes to rest on a large segment
of society rather than on the individual suffering the injury.65
63 344 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1959). For a discussion of the Oklahoma law on state
immunity prior to this case see 12 Okla. L. Rev. 184 (1959).
64 Id. at 568.
65 While this argument ignores the "direct benefit" theory (i.e., the users of the
highway are receiving a direct benefit for their payment which does not occur when
dealing with the general fund), it is submitted that this is a poor distinction on which
to allow recovery in one situation and deny it in another. This argument is really
just a makeweight used to support the protection-of-public-funds theory, and of even
less validity.
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Thus, even though the eventual loss falls on society in both situ-
ations, the fact that satisfaction must come from the general fund
in the Wolf type situation denies recovery under this isolation theory.
The results from the "financial independence" test are less then
perfect.
THEORrES FOR RETAINING IMMUNITY EXAMINED
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability
for tort rests upon a rotten foundation. It is almost incredible that
in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightment, and
in a republic, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit
in the maxim, "the King can do no wrong," should exempt the
various branches of the government from liability for their torts,
and that the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful
acts of the government should be imposed upon the single indi-
vidual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the
entire community constituting the government, where it could be
borne without hardship upon any individual, and where it justly
belongs. 66
The reason advanced by more recent cases for retaining immunity
is the protection of public funds and public property.67 This corre-
sponds to the "trust fund" theory upon which charitable immunity is
primarily based. The argument seems to follow the reasoning that it
is better for the individual to suffer than for the public to be in.
convenienced. The advent of the insurance concept has greatly
diminished the value of this approach. This factor, insurance, is the
main consideration of many of the courts which have refused im-
munity in certain situations. Much has been written recently con-
cerning the effect of liability insurance on municipal immunity.68
These articles apply to the states with equal vigor. The majority of
jurisdictions have held that the purchase of insurance is not a waiver
of sovereign immunity and that the insurance is enforceable only
when purchased to cover activities to which immunity does not ex-
tend.60 Thus, without changing this view, liability insurance could
be purchased to cover state business functions and the last remaining
reason for immunity, the protection of public funds, would lose any
validity it has. The thesis is not that the courts should find an im-
plied waiver of immunity upon the purchase of insurance, but rather
that immunity should not extend to these activities, since insurance is
available to cover this contingency. Of course the application of this
66 Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 NM. 85, 136 P.2d 480,482 (1943).
67 Supra notes 55, 62, 63, 64, and 65.
6s Gibbons, supra note 4 and materials cited therein; Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1437
(1959).
69 Gibbons, supra note 4 at 594.
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doctrine will raise the cost of government by the amount of the
premiums, but this cost would be spread over all of society in line
with the modern trend toward spreading the risk.
Inextricably interwoven with the insurance concept is the cost
of the government function to society as a whole. In a modern society
it is desirable to channel governmental effort into the most productive
endeavors. To determine whether this is being done, it is necessary
to compute the value to society of any governmental function. To
find its value, it is necessary to find the function's total cost; since
the infliction of tortious injury upon citizens is a cost to society, this
should be added to the cost of any state-run business. The most
accurate method of finding this cost is to allow recovery for these
injuries. Whether the cost is determined by the purchase of liability
insurance or by self-insurance, it must be found to determine whether
it is worthwhile to continue this function.
A side effect of such a doctrine is that it might indirectly lead
to the eventual waiver of immunity by state legislatures in response
to the lobbying of insurance companies. The companies are starting
to realize the potentialities of this untapped source of insurable risks.
Their efforts are already appearing in some states which have author-
ized the purchase of insurance to cover possible claims which are
usually within the immunity doctrine.7" Other states have required
insurance in some situations. 71 Since courts, with their typical con-
servative approach, have often held these purchases under permissive
statutes to be wasteful when intended to cover immune activities,
many governmental units have insured their employees.72 While this
device provides a remedy, it is not as effective as allowing the state
to be sued. If the jury does not realize the employee is insured, it
may be reluctant to return a verdict against him.73
The concept of self-insurance on the state level raises an im-
portant question. Should the state be self-insured, thus allowing
recovery out of the general fund, or should the state authorize or
require the purchase of insurance by the agencies created to engage
in business functions? While self-insurance is more feasible on the
state level than on the municipal level, this concept is vulnerable to
the protection-of-public-funds theory previously discussed. 74 Even
though this question should not be considered by the courts, since the
70 Id. at 596 et. seq.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Also, to make liability contingent upon the existance of insurance allows each
agency to decide if, and to what extent it will be answerable for its torts. This thesis
is explored further in the succeeding pages.
74 Supra pp. 659-661.
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cost to the state will frequently be less when it is self-insured, many
courts do consider the source from which damages would be paid.
Thus, it is important at least to mention the availability of liability
insurance to cover these risks when arguing that a court not extend
immunity into the area under consideration.
PROBLEMS IN TRADITIONALLY IMMUNE AREAS
The application of the suggested test is likely to extend into areas
which some courts have held to be always immune. This is true
despite the inclusion of the "traditionally private endeavor" concept
into the test. One such area is the immunity of school districts.75
The approach taken by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit District N. 3037o merits full consideration.
Plaintiff, while riding on defendant's school bus, was injured because
of the alleged negligence of the driver, and sought to hold the school
district liable. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed recovery despite
an abundance of authority to the contrary. The opinion is worthy of
a detailed analysis. Under the facts, the court was presented with
three alternative courses.
The first was a re-affirmation of immunity, based on the argument
that since the state is immune, so are school districts which are arms
or agencies of the state.
The second was to follow the course hinted at in an earlier Illinois
case involving the liability of a charitable educational institution. 77
There the court concluded that the school would be liable to the extent
it was insured. This approach would have been an easy escape for
the court since the Illinois School Code authorized the purchase of
liability insurance by any school district transporting children to and
from school. Also, the defendant school district in the suit was
covered by liability insurance (although not to the extent of the
amount prayed for by the plaintiff). However, the court chose not to
accept this easy way out since ". . . the difficulty with this legislative
effort to curtail the judicial doctrine is that it allows each school dis-
trict to determine for itself whether, and to what extent, it will be
financially responsible for the wrongs inflicted by it."78
7 Other similar areas are road and bridge construction and maintainance, public
beaches and parks, and police protection of citizens. (For a discussion of Schuster v. City
of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958) involving the liability of New York
City for failing to provide ample protection to the informer on Willie Sutton, see 72
Harv. L. Rev. 1386 (1959)).
70 IS Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
77 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
78 Supra note 76 at 13, 163 N.E.2d at 92. Cf., Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So. 2d 406
(Fla. Ct. App. 1959) where recovery was allowed against a state fish and game asso-
ciation only to the extent it was insured.
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The third possibility, and that chosen by the court, was the com-
plete abolition of immunity to school districts. In abolishing this
immunity the court felt that it should not base tort liability on the
"financial independence" test previously discussed. In rejecting the
"isolation-of-funds" theory, the court cited the permissive insurance
statutes and reasoned that if public funds could be used to purchase
the liability insurance, it also can be spent to pay liability itself in
the absence of insurance. The court did recognize the value of in-
surance in providing for this contingency and predicted that this
decision would encourage its wider use under the permissive statute.
Another meritorious approach by the court was its refusal to
wait for legislative change of the school immunity doctrine. The court
reasoned that since it had invoked the rule, it was the court's duty
to rid the law of a doctrine that had outlived its usefulness.79
Despite the logical reasoning of that decision, it is doubtful that
many courts will extend the test into this area. Many courts conclude
that because a rule has been established for many years, it can only
be changed by the legislature. While one basis for stare decisis is
reliance, it is not a good argument to state that one committed a tort
because he thought the state would be immune. The legitimate feel-
ing by the courts in this area is that any reversal depends upon a
consideration of public policy and that the legislature is best equipped
to perform this function. Of course, this ignores the fact that the
courts established immunity supposedly upon a consideration of the
public policy of an earlier time. This should entitle the courts to
re-examine these rules in light of the changed policies. However,
many courts are going to take the approach of Louisianas° by noticing
the policy change, but sending the injured claimant to the legislature
for relief.
Also, courts have not ignored the powerful lobby groups which fight
the overruling of immunity in many areas. Two examples of this are
the aftermath of the Molitor8l case and Gibbon v. YWCA 82 In the
former, the Illinois legislature overruled the case by expressly grant-
ing immunity to school districts 3 This may evidence a short-sighted
19 Id. at 16, 163 N.E.2d at 96: "The doctrine of school immunity was created by
this court alone. Having found that doctrine to be unsound and unjust under present
conditions, we consider that we have not only the power, but the duty, to abolish that
immunity. 'We dosed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can like-
wise open them'."
80 Supra note 40.
81 Supra note 76.
82 Supra note 55.
83 Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 122, pars. 821-831 (1959). At the same session, the Illinois
Legislature also granted sweeping immunity to park districts, counties, forest preserve
districts, and the Chicago Park District.
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view held by many legislators on the subject of immunity; fearing the
waiver of immunity will result in the breaking of the public coffers,
they fail to realize that injuries to citizens must ultimately be paid
for by society and that it is better to spread the loss at the time of
the injury. But this, an analysis of the reason for overruling such
cases perhaps, gives the legislature more credit than is due. The most
likely reason for such legislation is simply that the groups which have
had their immunity removed by the courts indulge in lobbying activi-
ties to have this immunity reinstated. Since the potential victim is
not represented, the legislators bend to the pressures of the lobbyists
without even looking to the underlying policy considerations.
In the Gibbon case, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to extend
the Avellone doctrine to the YWCA. One of the crutches leaned on
by the court was that public policy was evidenced by a bill passed by
the legislature8 4 (vetoed by the governor), which would have over-
ruled A vellone. For a court to rely on a bill which never became law
as an expression of public policy, rather than to analyze the problem
or to face up to the fact that the judges have changed their minds,
is a refusal by the court to shoulder its burden in our scheme of
government and is not excusable.
Thus, it may be that fear of legislative overruling, along with
a wariness toward any change in the status quo, influences the courts
in their decisions in this area to a considerable extent. These factors
may also explain why some courts interpret waiver statutes as narrowly
as possible, often completely destroying their effect.8 5
CONCLUSION
With many of the original reasons for sovereign immunity no
longer of any consequence, and few valid modern reasons to take their
place, courts should not be reluctant to re-examine the doctrine before
applying it to new situations. While it is true that any change in an
established doctrine necessarily limits the predictability of outcome
and is not in strict accordance with stare decisis, once a stand on the
main policy question has been taken by the court, the outcome in
many situations can be easily predicted. By denying immunity to
84 Sub. Sen. B. No. 241; See discussion of this bill and its probable effect on the
court in the Gibbon case in 21 Ohio St. L.J. 247, 249 n. 18 (1960).
85 One example of this is the Michigan court's interpretation of Michigan's waiver
of immunity statute, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 273548 (8), enacted in 1939 which provided
a board of state auditors "to hear and determine all claims and demands . . . against
the state and any of its . . . agencies." The court held this to waive only the state's
immunity from suit, not its immunity from tort liability, Manion v. State Highway
Comm'r, 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 677 (1942). For other similar
court injected limitations on statutory waivers, see Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 4.
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state-run businesses in competition with private enterprise in areas
which are primarily private, the courts can, without statutory au-
thority and without offending the principle of stare decisis, greatly
reduce the unjust impact of sovereign immunity at the state level.
The test propounded and urged in this comment is not intended
to be.the ultimate solution to the problem of state tort liability. It is
rather a stop-gap measure which the courts can use to mitigate some
of the bitter results obtained under the present law. Such problems
as: What to do when government takes over a field which once was
primarily private? 6 and, What to do in areas which seem to be
private but which no one but government undertakes in our era?s7
have not been discussed and no solution is presented herein. Only
the legislature can sweep aside the webs of tradition, stare decisis,
colloquialisms, and legal dogmas which plague even the few progres-
sive courts; only the legislature can reach a just solution of the prob-
lems of sovereign immunity.
Kenneth R. Millisor
86 The construction of roads, which at one time was completely private, has now
been almost completely taken over by government.
87 An example of this is garbage and refuse collection.
